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I. INTRODUCTION
T he elimination of racially segregated housing is a national goal of high
priority. This goal is reflected in the pronouncements of law-makers
and policy shapers, in decisional law, and in the existence of federal and
state legislation designed to eradicate ghettos and replace them with
"truly integrated and balanced" communities.' Yet segregated housing
patterns persist strongly,2 often finding their source and legitimization in
114 CONG. REc. 422 (1968).
For example, in 1980 72% of the metropolitan population of Cuyahoga County, in
which Parma, Ohio is situated, lived in a neighborhood either more than 95% non-white or
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the policies and practices of local governments. This Note will examine
an Ohio decision, United States v. City of Parma,' and its impact on two
issues: the bringing of a "pattern and practice" suit under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 19681 against a municipality in an attempt to alleviate
racially segregated housing patterns; and the valid scope of the judicially-
imposed remedies to be applied upon a finding of municipal liability. In
order to reach these issues, the origins, implications and mechanisms of
exclusionary land-use control will first be discussed, since the regulation
of land use plays a central role in the artificial restriction of access to
housing on the basis of race.
II. EXCLUSIONARY LAND USE CONTROLS
A. Zoning and the Police Power
Under the tenth amendment, the states are responsible for legislating
the health, safety and welfare of their citizens.' The states, in turn, dele-
gate the power to plan and control the use of land to local jurisdictions.6
Historically, the step from health, safety and welfare to land-use control
was not always seen as a self-evident one. If it seemed clear that under a
grant of power from the state a local government could provide fire pro-
tection, regulate traffic and operate medical facilities, it was not so clear,
particularly in the early years of the century, that the power (for exam-
ple) to limit construction within an area to large single-family homes fol-
lowed a priori.
Every first-year law student is familiar with the evolution of property
law from a feudal system in which title to all land vested in the crown to
the modern system in which the private individual, holding in fee simple,
possesses almost all the "sticks" in the metaphorical bundle comprising
important property rights. Yet despite the fee-holder's impressive num-
ber of sticks, he is subject to important limitations. Historically, the
more than 95% white. Nearly 50% of the population lived in neighborhoods more than 99%
non-white or 99% white. The county itself is nearly 25% non-white (unpublished research
on file at the Cuyahoga Plan of Ohio, Cleveland, Ohio).
1 494 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (liability opinion), 504 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Ohio
1980) (remedial order), aff'd in part, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
1972 (1982).
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3635 (1968).
The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
' Among the states, Hawaii constitutes the only comprehensive exception. See HAwAII
REV. STAT. § 205-1 (1973). For an examination of state attempts to control various types of
land use, see M. DANIELSON, THE POLITICS OF ExCLUSION ch. 10 (1976). Among major metro-
politan areas, Houston is the only one that still allows private agreement to control land use
exclusively. See Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J. LAW & ECON. 71 (1970).
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maxim "sic utere tuo alienum non laedas" enjoined the owner of prop-
erty from using it in ways injurious to that of another.
The common law of nuisance was an outgrowth of this limitation on
freedom of use. While at first it merely addressed actual physical inva-
sions of another's land, nuisance law, under the impact of industrializa-
tion and urbanization, grew to encompass intangible intrusions such as
smoke,7 dust,' and odors.' As generally formulated, an owner was not
"permitted to make an unreasonable use of his premises to the material
annoyance of his neighbor if the latter's enjoyment of life or property
[was] materially lessened thereby."'" The concept of nuisance operated to
make the location of the use the controlling factor; some uses, neutral in
themselves, became nuisances when placed in certain areas." In a famous
formulation, "[a] nuisance may be merely a right thing in a wrong place
- like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard."' 2
The common law of nuisance, however, had several drawbacks when
used as a mechanism for limiting the use of private property. Since it is a
reactive doctrine, "operat[ing] on the basis of after-the-fact adjudication
of injury,"'" nuisance law subjected property owners to the uncertainties
of litigation. Further, while it offered individuals some protection from
adjacent incompatible uses, nuisance theory was too narrow to benefit the
community at large. The development of zoning was a response to the
limitations of nuisance theory, growing out of the twin movements of in-
dustrialization and suburbanization that characterized the early 1900's.
The first comprehensive zoning law was passed in 1916 in New York
City. Prompted by the fear that the loft buildings of the garment district
would spill over onto the fashionable sections of Fifth Avenue, an ordi-
nance was enacted creating five use districts, and excluding tall, "undesir-
able" buildings from the exclusive shopping area. Within a year, twenty
cities had adopted zoning plans.'"
Zoning as a method of land-use control had clear advantages over pri-
vate agreement and nuisance law. With zoning, a municipality could em-
ploy its police power'" to regulate entire areas, restricting uses prospec-
Northwest Laundry v. City of Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916).
McCarthy v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N.Y. 40, 81 N.E. 549 (1907).
Reinmann v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
'o Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 A.D. 37, 39, 258 N.Y.S. 229, 231 (1932).
" A nuisance per se is an "act occupation or structure which is a nuisance in a given
area regardless of its manner of operation; a use of land that cannot be so conducted as to
be allowed to exist." Note, The Effect of Zoning Ordinances on the Law of Nuisance, 54
MICH. L. REV. 266, 268 (1955).
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
13 M. MANN, THE RIGHT TO HOUSING: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND REMEDIES IN EXCLU-
SIONARY ZONING 15 (1976).
" S. TOLL, ZONED AMERICA 187 (1969). By 1931, more than 1000 cities had comprehen-
sive land-use ordinances.
" "Police power" refers to the delegated ability to enforce laws necessary to preserve
1984-85]
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tively in accordance with public policy.' 6 Through the use of zoning,
property values were stabilized and uncertainty removed. However, sig-
nificant questions were soon raised by owners whose ability to profit from
their property was limited by the uses to which it could lawfully be put
according to zoning ordinances.
The question of whether the municipal police power over the health
and welfare of its citizens encompassed the power to legislate land use
reached the Supreme Court in 1926. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Re-
alty Co.,' 7 a developer whose suburban acreage was in the path of Cleve-
land's advancing urban growth desired to reap its full value as industrial
property. The developer was prevented from doing so by the village's zon-
ing plan, adopted by ordinance, which limited his parcel to less profitable
residential use. The developer asserted that the ordinance deprived him
of property without due process and denied him equal protection under
the law."' The Court held that the municipal police power encompassed
the function of land-use control and that subjecting private property to
government control by segregating disparate uses was not "clearly arbi-
trary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare."'19 Validating land-use control as
a proper exercise of the municipal police power signified a departure from
nuisance theory. Henceforth, determinations concerning use would be
governed not by actual injuries to others but by public policy."e Today, by
establishing zones where certain uses are permitted and certain prohib-
and protect the health and welfare of citizens.
16 This public policy, from its earliest expressions in New York City's zoning ordinance,
made the single-family dwelling the favorite child of the municipal plan. With tenements in
mind, early courts endorsed the superiority of the single-family home: "A man who is seek-
ing a permanent home would not deliberately choose to build next to an apartment." Miller
v. B6ard of Public Works, 234 P. 381, 387 (Cal. 1925).
The sentiment was forcefully expressed by one of the foremost advocates of land-use
reform:
The blighted districts in every municipality furnish depressing evidence of the
harmful effect upon both standards of living and housing development of the pre-
mature invasion of residential districts by non-residential uses. Promotion of the
single-family home, for instance, is deemed good public policy in America. It re-
quires little reasoning to show that this promotion will be aided by regulations
which protect and stabilize the single-family home districts.
Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 HARv. L. REv. 834, 839-40 (1924). Modern courts
reiterate this theme as well. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
For the argument that the values that give the single-family house preference are not enti-
tled to government protection, see Coase, The Problems of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1
(1960).
17 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
'" The fourteenth amendment states, in pertinent part: "Nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
" 272 U.S. at 395.
"0 MANN, supra note 13, at 21.
[Vol. 33:109
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ited, the local jurisdiction adopts a policy declaring the prohibited uses to
be nuisances per se. In his opinion for the Euclid Court, Justice Suther-
land stated:
The coming of one apartment house is followed by others, inter-
fering by their height and bulk with the free circulation of air and
monopolizing the rays of the sun . . . and bringing, as their nec-
essary accompaniments, the disturbing noises incident to in-
creased traffic and business . . . depriving children of the privi-
lege of quiet and open places for play . . . until finally the
residential character of the neighborhood . . . [is] . . . utterly de-
stroyed. Under these circumstances, apartment houses which in
a different environment would be not only entirely unobjection-
able but highly desirable, come very near to being nuisances."'
In Euclid, by means of the intermediate concept of nuisance, the step
was taken from use of the police power to legislate the public welfare to
its valid exercise in legislating land use. The results of this validation
were far-reaching.
B. Implications of Land Use Control
The control of land use is political. As a result of the power which is
vested in local jurisdictions, relatively small units of government, respon-
sible to and reflective of the values of a relatively small number of people,
are able to authoritatively decide land issues of great consequence. The
control of land through the political process has a direct impact on the
issues of minority housing, housing for the elderly, energy use and conser-
vation, transportation, sewage and water facilities, recreation, and tax
" 272 U.S. at 394 (emphasis in original). As will be developed, zoning in its many shapes
has the almost inevitable effect of excluding minorities from the suburbs, as well as the
palpable intent to do so. One commentator aptly points out that "once zoning powers be-
came available to local governments, it was probably inevitable that municipalities would
use them to advance the full scope of their interests." Nelson, A Private Property Theory of
Zoning, 11 URa. LAW. 713, 715 (1979). Euclid has most certainly been used to validate the
attitude of extreme judicial deference adopted towards local zoning ordinances. However,
there is clear language within Euclid itself that points to the Justices' intent that the mu-
nicipal police power in this regard not be untrammeled. The premise of Euclid was that use
control would take place according to a scientifically developed comprehensive plan which
would take into account the relationship of a city to a broader zone of interests. Thus the
police power itself was subject to larger policy considerations. Justice Sutherland wrote:
"[Ilt is not meant by this ... to exclude the possibility of cases where the general public
interest would so far outweigh the interest of the municipality that the municipality would
not be allowed to stand in the way [of a proposed use]." 272 U.S. at 390. This limitation on
the police power to control land use, implicit in its very grant, has been generally unheeded,
especially by the Burger Court, which continues to apply Euclid to support the parochial
concerns of exclusionist communities.
1984-85]
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rates.22 The control of land use is not inherently evil. It can meet the
prospect of any uncontrolled development which would threaten the le-
gitimate needs of residents in a community. However, the "land use he-
gemony of local communities" 2 can also have exclusionary results, both
intended and unintended. Through political decisions reflecting a local
jurisdiction's values and wishes, unwanted groups can effectively be
barred from residence.2 4 In a society that claims to embody democratic
values, the exclusion of racial minorities, people of low-income, or the de-
velopmentally disabled 25 from areas where they seek housing represents a
glaring contradiction. Yet land-use controls have inevitably been em-
1 Lamb, Housing Discrimination and Segregation in America: Problematical Dimen-
sions and the Federal Legal Response, 30 CATH. U.L. REV. 363, 381-81 (1981).
23 McGee, Illusion and Contradiction in the Quest for a Desegregated Metropolis, 1976
U. ILL. L. REV. 958, 952.
" That the effect of comprehensive zoning plans could be to stratify populations was
recognized by the Euclid trial court: "The purpose to be accomplished is really to regulate
the mode of persons who may hereafter inhabit [the property]. In the last analysis, the
result to be accomplished is to classify the population and segregate them according to their
income or their situation in life." Euclid v. United States, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924).
The Supreme Court, in reversing the lower court, set aside this issue for future considera-
tion, stating:
[lt is enough for us to determine, as we do, that the ordinance in its general scope
and dominant features, so far as its provisions are here involved, is a valid exercise
of authority, leaving other provisions to be dealt with as cases arise directly in-
volving them . . . . In the realm of constitutional law, especially, this court has
perceived the embarrassment which is likely to result from an attempt to formu-
late rules or decide questions beyond the necessities of the immediate use.
272 U.S. at 397.
However because of its reluctance to intervene in matters of local land-use control, the
Court has reviewed a very small number of such cases. Between the 1926 Euclid opinion and
1974, there were more than 10,000 land-use cases officially reported in the highest and inter-
mediate state courts. 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW vii (1975). Of this num-
ber, the Supreme Court considered two zoning cases, both in 1928: Nectrow v. City of Cam-
bridge, 277 U.S. 183 (zoning ordinance unreasonable when applied to particular tract), and
Seattle Title and Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (consent provision in zoning ordinance
which effectively gave citizens veto power over adjacent property uses stricken as invalid).
McGee, supra note 23, at 987.
Between 1971 and 1976, reflecting the increased volume of exclusionary land-use litigation,
the Court had eighteen opportunities to address land-use issues, but denied certiorari to all
but five: City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976) (referendum
excluding low-income housing upheld as constitutional); Hill v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284
(1976) (interdistrict remedy appropriate to correct city housing authority and federal gov-
ernment agency's segregative housing policy); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (non-
residents barred from challenging the validity of exclusionary zoning ordinances); Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 US. 1 (1974) (ordinance zoning entire community for single-
family homes upheld); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (city ordinance mandating
referendum to approve zoning changes held not unconstitutional).
"6 For an account of one suburb's recent attempts to grapple with the issue of zoning for
group homes for the developmentally disabled, see Sun Press (Shaker Heights, Ohio), Feb.
3, 1983, at 1A, col. 5; Id., Feb. 24, 1983, at 1A, col. 4.
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ployed for these purposes."
Even when unintended, "nearly every land use control entails some ex-
clusion . . . by raising the costs that the market would otherwise
charge. ' 27 Further, intentional exclusion can be seen in a great number of
suburban zoning ordinances.2 8 Thus, income is the first barrier in the
quest for unrestricted housing opportunity. Although discrimination on
the basis of income has been held invalid with regard to voting rights,2 9
residency requirements as a precondition to receiving welfare benefits,
30
and procedural protection in criminal cases, i the complicated interplay
of factors in the housing area has discouraged extension of the doctrine of
equal protection to cover the case of unequal treatment in access to hous-
ing.3 2 Further, although shelter is a judicially-recognized necessity of
life,3" the right to housing is not considered to be a fundamental one, nor
" Under some analyses, zoning's original purposes were benign and only later became
distorted to serve as an instrument of economic and social exclusion. See M. MANN, supra
note 13, at 6. Other commentators, however, point out that the earliest examples of racial
zoning pre-date the development of comprehensive zoning plans such as New York City's.
The earliest example (except for that of the Indian reservations) is the San Francisco ordi-
nance of 1890 which required all Chinese to remove themselves within days to points
outside the city or to designated waste areas within the city. In In re Lee Sing, 42 F. 359
(N.D. Cal. 1890), the ordinance was held unconstitutional and violative of the American
treaty with China.
The history of racial zoning which preceded the enactment of comprehensive zoning plans
continued with zoning specifically aimed at restricting the residence of blacks. Nine years
before Euclid, in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), the Supreme Court invalidated
zoning prohibitions based soley on race. The pattern of municipalities ever since has been
one of subterfuge, and the use of exclusionary land control has accomplished indirectly what
could not be done directly. Buchanan had the immediate effect of encouraging deed restric-
tions as an alternate method of segregating housing. Such racial covenants were outlawed
after a long tenure, in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The classic work on the history
of racial segregation is R. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d rev. ed. 1974).
27 D. JUDD, THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN CITIES: PRIVATE POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY 186
(1979). "From its inception to the present, zoning became the legal justification to insure
what social and class barriers might not have prevented - the exclusion of the Great Un-
washed." Id.
2 C. HAAR & D. IATRIDES, HOUSING THE POOR IN SUBURBIA: PUBLIC POLICY AT THE GRASS
ROOTS 15 (1974).
2 McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs., 349 U.S. 739 (1969).
30 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
" Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
" "Any restrictions which impose higher standards are likely to increase development
costs to some extent; yet is is inconceivable that a court would hold invalid any and all
attempts to raise the standards of residential development, for legitimate consideration of
health and amenity are involved." 2 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW 608-10
(1975). Nevertheless, it is clear that at least two practices are too overt to withstand judicial
scrutiny: the requirement of a minimum income within a given residential area, and the
requirement of a minimum dwelling cost. Id.
"a Black v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921).
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does the Constitution guarantee any particular quality of housing. 34 Nev-
ertheless, it is clear that excluding individuals from an area of residence
on the basis of income is equivalent to doing so on the basis of race, es-
sentially accomplishing an effect that cannot be achieved lawfully by
more overt means. This is so because, despite the growth of the black
middle class, minorities are radically overrepresented among the poor
and, as a group, will be excluded in disproportionate numbers when in-
come forms the basis for access to housing.3
The values which motivate the exclusion of blacks" from suburbs such
as Parma, Ohio are strong and deeply felt. The presence of low-income
housing of the type at issue in Parma may be equated with the presence
of blacks in the community. 7 The presence of blacks is representative of
all that white suburban dwellers desired to escape or avoid when they
chose not to live in the central city. Many residents of relatively new
blue-collar suburbs like Parma have moved directly from the city and feel
deep hostility at the perceived necessity of moving again. Such a suburb
is one "whose very existence is often a reaction to inner-city desegrega-
tion.""5 In a survey of four Dayton, Ohio suburbs, lower-income house-
holds were associated in the minds of the white respondents with "falling
property values, neighborhood instability, deteriorating housing condi-
tions, rising property taxes, more crime, unsuitable neighbors, and a loss
of social status for existing residents."" The arrival of subsidized housing
is often viewed as the initiation of all the problems of the inner cities.4 0
34 Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
" In 1980 the federal government set the poverty level for a family of four at $7,356.
The 1980 census found that 10.48% of white families and 42.5% of black families were
impoverished. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, sum-
mary Tape File 3 (1980). Cf. Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARv. L.
REv. 1645, 1655-57 (1971) (disproportionate poverty of minorities may be responsible for
discrimination along class lines).
36 "Minority" and "black" are by no means synonymous terms. Yet, because in metro-
politan Cleveland, the locus of the Parma decisions, blacks are the predominant minority,
and because equal housing opportunity for black Americans is the theme enunciated by the
decisions, the convention of equating "minority" and "black" will be adopted here.
"' United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1073 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (liability
opinion).
38 McGee, supra note 23, at 995.
39 M. DANIELSON, supra note 6, at 83, (quoting N. GRUEN & C. GRUEN, LOW AND MODER-
ATE INCOME HOUSING IN THE SUBURBS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE DAYTON, OHIO REGION 64
(1972)). Significantly, Gruen and Gruen found of those surveyed, only 2% were willing to
list "race" as a "very important" reason for "considering low/moderate-income households
undesirable neighbors." Id. Blatantly expressed racial prejudice was perhaps not seen by the
respondents as an attitude to be revealed in public, while the desire to "protect property
values" was viewed as more socially acceptable.
40 During the period of Parma's subsidized housing controversy, Mayor John Petruska
was quoted as saying, "Parma people have to take care of themselves, and leave Cleveland's
problems for Mayor Ralph Perk." M. DANIELSON, supra note 6, at 95 (quoting Cleveland
Plain Dealer, June 23, 1971).
[Vol. 33:109
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol33/iss1/7
"PATTERN AND PRACTICE" SUITS
The xenophobic character of the suburban reaction is demonstrated by a
survey of Westchester County, New York, in which eighty-three percent
of the respondents were favorable to subsidized housing if "people now
living in this town" got first priority in moving into such housing, while
seventy-six percent opposed such development if no priorities were as-
signed on the basis of where the occupant lived.41
The hostility of white suburbs to the encroachment of blacks and the
accompanying employment of exclusionary land controls arises from a de-
mographic possibility that has its basis in reality. It is the case that the
suburbs have "most of the vacant land available for housing development
in metropolitan areas."' 2 Further, among suburbs in general, low- and
moderate-income suburbs are the most likely to attract subsidized hous-
ing since they commonly have requisites which planners consider impor-
tant when choosing housing sites: industry, access to public transporta-
tion, existing sewage facilities and, perhaps most important,
comparatively low land prices, which are within reach of the private de-
veloper of subsidized housing.4 3 Also, cases over the last fifteen years have
suggested that judicially imposed limits can be on the amount of low-
income housing capable of being located in areas already having a concen-
tration of minorities and subsidized housing, i.e. older metropolitan cen-
ters." As a corollary, "[r]acially motivated opposition to subsidized hous-
ing is greatest among less affluent suburbanites,""' as they react to the
potential disruption of their homogeneous enclaves. 46 The foregoing sug-
gests that there is strong motivation to erect land-use barriers to subur-
ban racial integration and that in response to pressure from their constit-
uencies, officials who should employ the classical comprehensive zoning
plan to produce racial integration instead use it to exclude. Such commu-
1 M. DANIELSON, supra note 6, at 111 (quoting OLIVER QUAYLE & Co., A SURVEYo 0 Arri-
TUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENT-ASSISTED MODERATE AND Low INCOME HOUSING IN WESTCHES-
TER COUNTY 74, 63 (1972)).
42 M. DANIELSON, supra note 6, at 81.
11 Id. at 91.
14 Hill v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) (Chicago); Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175
(N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd in part and rev'd in part without opinion, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir.
1973) (Cleveland); Shannon v. United States Dep't. of Housing and Urban Dev., 436 F.2d
809 (1970) (Philadelphia).
4" M. DANIELSON, supra note 6, at 91 (quoting OLIVER QUAYLE & Co., supra note 41, at
73). This part of the study showed that 60% of low- and moderate-income respondents were
"against subsidized housing because it forces racial integration on people," while 36% of
middle- and upper-income respondents held this attitude.
" In Parma, Ohio, the racism reflected in local newspaper accounts of the subsidized
housing controversy, and other literature, has an ironic side: The 1980 census reflects the
suburb's strong ethnic character, with 26.7% of respondents indicating Eastern European
ancestry. The largest single group indicated Polish ancestry. U.S. BUREAU O THE CENSUS.
1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, Summary Tape File 3 (1980). "[T]he newly-ar-
rived victims of prejudice in one generation have become, a generation or two (or three)
later, the old residents objecting to a newer group." N. WILLIAMS, supra note 32, at 568.
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nity leaders "have been placed at Thermopylae to keep the barbarians
out, if only for a time, rather than to direct them where to pitch their
tents." '
C. Mechanisms of Exclusion
Because of the strong motivation of white suburbs to resist integration
and the capability to do so endowed by the grant of police power from the
state, numerous mechanisms have developed to protect suburban exclu-
siveness from racial integration. The "variety of land use policies and de-
vices which are adaptable for the [racially exclusionary] purpose is almost
infinite."4 However numerous, these practices can be divided roughly
into three groups: conventional zoning restrictions, the promotion of citi-
zen control over the disposition of the community's real property, and
policy-making with indirect exclusionary effect.
1. Conventional Zoning Strictures
The most overt way to exclude unwanted minorities is to use the com-
prehensive zoning plan to make housing too expensive for them to af-
ford."' This can be accomplished through zoning code enactments which
mandate certain construction methods: large lot sizes,"0 minimum build-
ing sizes,' and large floor areas per dwelling.52 Building occupancy can
also be legislated by zoning ordinance. The historic preference for single-
family occupancy, when given expression in zoning plans limiting multi-
family housing, has the effect of removing the best hope for improving
the housing situation of low- and mid-income people. Multi-family con-
struction is probably the only suburban housing feasible for the poor and
mid-income. The attractiveness of this type of construction to developers
stems from the economies of scale possible as well as the federal incen-
tives offered to multi-family projects. As a direct result, "zoning for
47 D. MOSKOWITZ, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING LITIGATION 7 (1977).
41 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 32, at 585.
19 The relationship between economic status and race has already been noted, supra
note 35.
60 Large-lot zoning has been invalidated on the basis that it is exclusionary. E.g.,
Kurzius v. Village of Upper Brookville, 67 A.D.2d. 70, 414 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1979); S. Burling-
ton County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
5' "The purpose of zoning requirements in minimum -building- size may be stated quite
simply: to force up the cost of housing, thus insuring that low- and middle-income buyers
turn elsewhere." N. WILLIAMS, supra note 32, at 624.
62 An "argument is sometimes brought in that such regulations tend to protect the pub-
lic health .... A number of scholarly studies have demonstrated that there is some rela-
tionship between insufficient space . . .and emotional tensions which in turn may effect
public health and family stability and so on." Id. at 627. The real nature of such controls is
revealed by the fact that they are seldom based on occupancy, so that legislation requiring
big houses is blind to whether they are occupied by five people or fifteen. Id.
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[only] single-family detached houses is now the most important of the
exclusionary techniques . . . ."' If not severely limited or banned out-
right, zoning impediments may be placed in the way of multi-family con-
struction, making it unappealing to developers. In Parma, for example,
the zoning code mandated an unusually large number of parking spaces
per multi-family dwelling unit, driving the cost of such construction up to
unattractive levels. The related tactic of balking at granting variances to
the builders of unwanted developments will be considered later.
With the emergence of national concern over ecology, and the growth of
the environmental movement in the 1970s, another zoning tactic became
available for suburbs that wished to halt population change: halting pop-
ulation growth. A no-growth zoning plan may contain some or all of the
following: bans on specified types of construction, a moratorium on all
construction, ceilings on the number of new units constructed per year,
limitations on water resource or sewage development, and restraints on
utility connections. The power of these measures to exclude is self-evi-
dent, and "those seeking to challenge the barriers erected by suburban
communities . . . found that their opponents ...latched onto the envi-
ronmental cause to defend their zoning, land use, housing and growth
policies.' ' 4 The accomplishment of the goals of the environmental move-
ment - fewer people and more green space, for example - drives up the
cost of land acquisition, eliminating sites for the construction of low- and
moderate-income housing.
Environmental groups and local officials who employ ecological
rationales commonly contend that they are not opposed to subsi-
dized housing in their suburbs per se, but to measures that will
consume more land, stimulate growth, and downgrade the local
environment .. .which of course means keeping lower-income
groups where they are. 5
In United States v. City of Parma,56 the defendant city argued that its
exclusionary land use ordinances were a response to citizen concern over
" Id. at 666.
54 M. BROOKS, HOUSING EQUITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE NEEDLESS CON-
FLICT 52 (1976) The increasing use of the environmental defense reflects a change in fair
housing litigation as it developed after 1968, the watershed year of Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1866 Civil Rights Act bars all racial discrimination in the sale or rental
of property), the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631, and the Housing and Urban
Development Act, Pub. L. No. 90-12, 82 Stat, 476 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.,
12 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). Prior to the 1968, most litigation centered on refusals to rent or
sell to minorities. After that year, the focus shifted to the suburban attempt to halt develop-
ers who desired to use vacant suburban land for low- and moderate-income housing. Id. at
51.
" M. DANIELSON, supra note 6, at 87-8.
" 494 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (liability opinion).
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the environment.5 7 The ordinances had been passed in 1971 and had ap-
peared on the ballot by initiative petition. One ordinance limited the
height of all future residential construction to thirty-five feet. The other
required voter approval for construction of any subsidized housing or any
participation in rent supplement programs. The impetus for the enact-
ment of the ordinances was the attempt of a private developer, Forest
City Enterprises, Inc. (FCE), to construct a federally subsidized section
236 apartment project,5" twenty percent of whose low-income tenants
would also be receiving federal rent supplements."9 From the inception of
the proposal, the development was debated, "often in blatantly racial
terms."60 The passage of the restrictive ordinances occurred at the climax
of the controversy. The day after the election, the city engineer rejected
the plans for the subsidized development, killing a project whose death
was already a foregone conclusion. At trial, to counter the government's
contention that the passage of these ordinances was (among other ac-
tions) evidence of a pattern or practice of racial discrimination in viola-
tion of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, the city advanced its environmental
defense. "Specifically, high-rise buildings were mentioned as being fire
hazards . . . creating traffic congestion . . . causing ecological and aes-
thetic damage . . . and overloading sewage facilities."'"
Although the district court accepted the fact that some Parma resi-
dents were sincerely motivated by ecological concerns, the evidence per-
suaded the court that racial considerations were decisive. First, in his
deposition, the city engineer admitted that high-rise construction was not
I ld. at 1086-87.
68 Under the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, two new housing subsidy
programs were created: § 235 (12 U.S.C. § 1715z) and § 236 (12 U.S.C. § 175z01). The
§ 236 program offered reduced rents to tenants, made possible by federal subsidization of
project mortgages above a certain rate. The programs were very successful in terms of sheer
numbers. Between 1969 and 1973 they spurred 540,000 subsidized units, over half the total
number of units constructed under all the subsidy programs of the previous 30 years. Sloan,
The Changing Shape of Land use Litigation: Federal Court Challenges to Exclusionary
Land Practices, 51 NOTRE DAME L.J. 48, 53 (1975).
Unlike older subsidy programs, §§ 235 and 236 did not require local government approval
per se to locate in the suburbs - that is to say that the significant stumbling block of the
formal cooperation agreement was removed, leaving only local zoning ordinances to over-
come. However, these ordinances, along with negative public opinion, were equally effective
in thwarting subsidized housing. One estimate is that less than one quarter of the record
number of subsidized units built in 1971 were sited in the suburbs. A. DowNs, OPENING UP
THE Su3URas: AN URBAN STRATEGY FOR AMERICA 156 (1973). Also, unfortunately for the
cause of subsidized housing in the suburbs, the 235-236 programs were plagued by scandals
which received wide publicity in the 1970's. Slipshod construction, graft, and poor mainte-
nance were widely complained of. M. DANIELSON, supra note 6, at 86. As of 1980, § 236 was
no longer being federally funded. 494 F. Supp. at 1078.
" This was in accordance with the policy of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. 494 F. Supp. at 1078.
"0 Id. at 1087.
" Id. at 1086.
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inherently more unsafe than the low-rise type. Further, Parma at that
time had fire equipment capable of handling emergencies in tall build-
ings. In addition, no anxiety about the hazard of fire was expressed the
previous year when FCE built a six-story "luxury" development. 2 Sec-
ond, concerning traffic congestion, no evidence was introduced at trial to
support the contention that traffic was a concern, nor were any studies
done on potential traffic problems before the rejection of the section 236
project. 63 Finally, the city engineer was never asked to study the impact
of the subsidized development on Parma's sewer system, nor did he do so
independently." The environmental defense, decisively rejected by the
Parma court, has had a similar lack of success as a litigation technique in
other fair housing cases as well. 5 It can be concluded that the defense
will fail when it appears to the court that ecological concern is a mere
pretext concealing discriminatory motives or where it seems that there is
some genuine environmental concern, but also an admixture of discrimi-
natory intent.
2. Citizen Control
The charters under which municipal corporations operate usually in-
clude a reservation of referendum power, granting to the electorate the
capacity to approve or reject any legislative act by majority vote." Fol-
lowing the establishment of the section 235 - 236 housing program in
1968, many suburbs enacted ordinances requiring that such subsidized
housing projects be submitted to popular referendum.6 7 Establishing a
referendum requirement for public housing places a potent veto power in
the hands of the community. Demanding such direct participation in lo-
cal land-use decisions may reflect a fear that officials might not be able to
resist pressure from public housing developers.6 8 The right to resist these
pressures by means of the referendum was upheld by the Supreme Court
6 Id. at 1087.
8aId.
e Id.
'5 Other cases in which the environmental defense was not successful are: S. Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) (city contended that
lot-size ordinance was motivated by ecological concern); Kennedy Park Homes v. City of
Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1010 (1971) (city rezoned area selected for low-income housing project as park, and
cited problematic sewer and flooding situation); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 296 F. Supp. 266
(W.D. Okla. 1969), a/I'd, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970) (city officials justified denial of
zoning change to proposed § 236 project by citing need to use parcel for park, and increased
burden on public services). But see Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
"e In Ohio, the power of referendum is reserved to each municipality "on all questions
which such municipalitites may now or hereafter be authorized by law to control by legisla-
tive action." OHO CONsT. art. II, § 1(f).
" M. DANIELSON, supra note 6, at 100.
Is d.
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in 1971. In James v. Valtierra,9 the Court held that article 34 of the
California state constitution, making low-income housing projects contin-
gent on local approval, was not violative of the federal Constitution. Jus-
tice Black, writing for a five-member majority, reasoned that the equal
protection clause was not offended by the California provision because all
low-rent projects were affected, not only those that would be occupied by
minorities. "Provisions for referendums demonstrate devotion to democ-
racy, not bias, discrimination, or prejudice, ' 70 Justice Black stated. The
fact that the results of referendums always disadvantage the losing side,
he asserted does not mean that the losers have been denied equal protec-
tion.71 The constitutionality of the effects of the referendum was not
reached, the case being decided only on affidavits in support of a motion
for summary judgment.
The power of the voter to veto unwanted development was given fur-
ther support five years later by City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter-
prises, Inc.72 In that case, the city charter of a Cleveland suburb had been
amended to require that any changes in land use agreed upon by the city
council nonetheless be submitted to referendum, with a fifty-five percent
majority needed for passage. 73 The Ohio Supreme Court held that making
zoning changes referable constituted an impermissible delegation of legis-
lative power and subjected the rights of private land-owners to the "ca-
price" of "thousands of voters with no interest whatever in property. 74
However, in reversing, the Supreme Court found that the referendum was
69 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
7o Id. at 141.
" Id. at 142. The dissenters in James, Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, (Jus-
tice Douglas took no part), identified the constitutional provision as invidious discrimina-
tion on the "basis of poverty - a suspect classification which demands exacting judicial
scrutiny" under the terms of the fourteenth amendment, just as race does. Id. at 145.
How powerful a weapon the referendum is in blocking public housing is indicated by its
success in California. Between 1950, the year of the adoption of the referendum provision,
and 1970, approximately half of all public/subsidized housing proposals were defeated by
local electorates. M. DANIELSON, supra note 6, at 100.
72 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
" The provision also put the costs of the mandatory referral on the applicant for the
zoning change.
" 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 199-200, 324 N.E.2d 740, 748-49 (1975) (J. Stern concurring).
Judge Stern went on to write:
There can be little doubt of the true purpose of Eastlake's charter provision - it
is to obstruct changes in land use by rendering such change so burdensome as to
be prohibitive. The charter provision was apparently adopted specifically, to pre-
vent multi-family housing, and indeed was adopted while Forest City's application
for rezoning to permit a multi-family housing project was pending .... The re-
strictive purpose of the provisions is crudely apparent on its face .... There is
no subtlety to this; it is simply an attempt to render change difficult and expen-
sive under the guise of popular democracy.
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not a delegation of power, but a power that, under the Ohio state consti-
tution, had been reserved to the people from the beginning. While Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the Court, conceded that the Euclid doctrine
would support a challenge to a referendum resulting in the enforcement
of a zoning restriction that was itself unreasonable or arbitrary, he as-
serted that no challenge to the actual Eastlake zoning code was before the
court.
71
Seven months after the Supreme Court's decision in James v.
Valtierra, the city of Parma enacted an ordinance substantially similar to
California's article 34. Parma's General Building Regulation 1528 re-
quired elector approval of "(1) the development, construction or acquisi-
tion in any manner of a subsidized housing project by a public body, or
(2) any participation by private individuals or non-public bodies in any
program in which the Federal Government pays all or part of the rent of
low-income families. ' 71 This ordinance was enacted concurrently with the
height-regulation ordinance during the controversy surrounding the de-
velopment of the section 236 project.77 In November, 1974, Parma voters
enacted another ordinance, Building Code 1229.01, requiring voter ap-
proval of any change in existing land uses or land-use ordinances.
In Parma, the government assailed the referendum requirements as vi-
olating the Fair Housing Act. In striking the ordinances, the Parma dis-
trict court called the effect of the city's referendum requirements "devas-
tating," 8 noting that the required referenda operated together to block
both developers of subsidized housing who would need zoning changes to
effectuate their plans and those who would not. When taken together
with the two-and-one-half parking-space-per-dwelling-unit requirement,
the court held that "the cumulative effect. . . is to prevent construction
of any low-income housing in the City. Developers will not even attempt
to bring low-income public housing proposals to the City, where it is clear
that at best they will receive no cooperation from Parma officials, and at
worst they will encounter deep-rooted resistance. 79
Despite the earlier holdings of James and Eastlake, the Parma court
achieved a different result by proceeding on statutory, as opposed to con-
" 426 U.S. at 676.
7" United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1086 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (liability
opinion).
" During the same campaign that resulted in passage of the two ordinances, the mayor
and members of his council stood for reelection. One piece of their political advertising read:
SPECIAL MESSAGE: Your entire endorsed democratic slate is pledged to defend
the rights of the residents of Parma to establish building standards by referendum
ballot and will fight in the federal courts any pressures from outside agencies or
organizations ....
M. DANIELSON, supra note 6, at 101.
" 494 F. Supp. at 1089.
" Id. at 1090.
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stitutional, grounds and by connecting the referenda to racial exclusion."0
The district court declared that because the city's actions "were moti-
vated by racial bigotry,"'" sections 3604(a) and 3617 of the Fair Housing
Act had been violated,8 2 and thus, under the Act's section 3615, the refer-
enda were "to that extent. . . invalid.' 83 The ordinance mandating a ref-
erendum on low-income housing projects was found to be discriminatory
in both motivation and effect8" and was found to serve no legitimate city
interest." Accordingly, it was declared completely invalid. In contrast,
the ordinance making all zoning changes referable was not limited to low-
and moderate-income housing and was declared invalid only to the extent
that its prospective application would be to such development.86 The
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the district court's actions
regarding Parma's referenda, noting that "[t]hough invalidation of an or-
dinance is a strong remedy, it is not beyond the power of a court where
necessary to correct a violation."8
3. Municipal Policy-Making with Indirect Exclusionary Effects
Exclusionary mechanisms such as restrictive zoning codes and referen-
dum requirements are easily identified exclusionary land-use controls.
Other mechanisms act more indirectly yet just as effectively to exclude
unwanted groups from the suburbs. City policies which are "seemingly
1o In a footnote, the district court distinguished Parma from James on the basis of the
James Court's statement that the record there would not support the claim that the seem-
ingly neutral constitutional provision was in fact aimed at a racial minority. 494 F. Supp. at
1099 n.66. However, in James, the Supreme Court implicitly based its reasoning on its re-
fusal to inquire into the motivation for a "neutral" policy which had as an effect adverse
impact on minorities. If the same Court had subjected the Parma referenda to the same
analysis, it is arguable that the referenda would have been upheld on constitutional grounds.
494 F. Supp. at 1099.
82 Section 3604(a) states that it shall be unlawful "to refuse to sell or rent after the
making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise
make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin." Section 3617 states that it shall be unlawful "to coerce, intimidate, threaten
or interfere with any preson in the exercise or enjoyment of ... any right granted or pro-
tected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.
" Chapter 42 U.S.C. § 3615 states:
Nothing in this title . .. shall be construed to invalidate or limit any law of a
state or political subdivision of a state . . . but any law of a state, a political
subdivision, or other such jurisdiction that purports to require or permit any ac-
tion that would be a discriminatory housing practice under this title ... shall to
that extent be invalid.
Id.
84 504 F. Supp. 913, 919 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (remedial order).
" Id. at 920.
88 Id.
87 661 F.2d 562, 578 (6th Cir. 1981).
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neutral on [their] face"8 8 and widely considered to be within the govern-
mental discretion of a municipality also defeat low- and moderate-income
housing.
The decision of a city's legislative body to pass or to defeat certain res-
olutions is within the scope of municipal power. Yet, for example, in
Parma the widely publicized defeat of a fair-housing resolution in 1968
was found by the district court to have an exclusionary effect, enhancing
the city's reputation as a restricted community hostile to blacks.8 9
Similarly, the decision to adopt a flexible, cooperative attitude in deal-
ing with developers and the zoning problems encountered during con-
struction projects is within the realm of municipal discretion. However,
the differential exercise of this type of discretion can act to discourage
developers from proceeding with plans for subsidized housing opposed by
the community. For instance, in 1971 Parma allowed Forest City Enter-
prises to sail with ease over several zoning and building code impedi-
ments to the construction of its luxury development, Parmatown Tow-
ers.90 However, the next year, when the subject matter of FCE's
discussions with the city of Parma was the section 236 project,
Parmatown Woods, the same impediments which were easily surmounted
in the case of Parmatown Towers were used by the city as effective
blockades.9'
88 James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971).
89 In 1968, a fair housing resolution was placed before Parma city council. The resolution
could have no legally binding effect. It stated that "all persons of goodwill have been and
are welcome in the city of Parma by this Council," and at the same time asserted "this
Council defends the individual property owners [sic] right to sell, lease, rent, control or
dispose of their private house and their right of association and the private enjoyment and
use of their own homes." Despite the lukewarm language of the resolution, it was hotly
debated by the council and the community. The sponsor of the resolution, who later admit-
ted he was ashamed of the weak language, received one hundred letters and phone calls
opposing the resolution. Community meetings were held concerning the proposal. It was
finally defeated by the Parma city council by a vote of 7 to 5. 494 F. Supp. at 1067-69.
90 One problem impeding the project was that the street on which Parmatown Towers
was to front had not been dedicated to the city prior to the grant of the building permit.
Had Parma refused to accept the dedication, the Cleveland Water Department could have
declined to review the development plans and to hook up water connections. Further, non-
acceptance would have relieved Parma of the obligation to provide garbage pick-up and
other services. Parma's actions violated its Planning and Zoning Code § 1101.06; however,
this did not prevent construction of Parmatown Towers. Instead the city accepted the dedi-
cation of the street for record purposes on the same day that Forest City Enterprises ap-
peared with the tardy dedication request, and the Parmatown Towers project proceeded to
completion. 494 F. Supp. at 1075-76. The district court concluded that "the manner in
which the Parmatown Towers matter was handled indicated that Parma would bend the
rules when it wished to cooperate with a developer of a non-subsidized multi-family housing
project." Id. at 1077.
91 The § 236 project, Parmatown Woods, was to be sited on a plot adjacent to
Parmatown Towers and involved another undedicated street. Instead of the flexibility that
had characterized the city's attitude concerning the luxury apartment project, Parma
1984-85]
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1984
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
Another area of policy making within a city's discretionary realm is
that of application for federal funds. For example, under the guidelines of
Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, known
as the Community Development Block Grant Program (CDBG), 2 no city
may be forced to apply for federal funds to implement local housing and
community development. However, the failure to apply for such funds, or
the failure to adhere to application requirements, can signify opposition
to the government's requirement that cities receiving CDBG monies plan
for the housing needs of present and expected low-income residents.
Parma, for instance, applied for CDBG funds during 1974, the first year
of the program. However, by specifying that the city had no plans to as-
sist low-income households that year, and by refusing to revise these
plans, the city disqualified itself from receiving federal funds." The dis-
trict court noted that "[tlo maintain the City's all-white character, mil-
lions of dollars in federal funds were rejected by the citizens of the com-
munity and their elected officials. The effect of this rejection was to
further insulate the community against low-income housing and increased
opportunities for minority housing.
' 4
Similarly, a suburb is free to decide whether to cooperate with local or
regional housing authorities in siting subsidized housing within its juris-
diction. In northeast Ohio, the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Author-
ity (CMHA) is empowered to develop public housing in the suburbs; each
project is contingent upon entering into a cooperation agreement with the
local government." Failure to enter into such an agreement effectively
precludes development of CMHA public housing. Parma, like most other
northeast Ohio suburbs, rebuffed CMHA's attempt to conclude a cooper-
ation agreement.98 The district court found that racial reasons motivated
this refusal and, in its remedial opinion, ordered Parma to either sign an
adopted an unmoveable stance regarding the subsidized project. The review of the
Parmatown Woods plan stopped immediately upon discovery of the street dedication prob-
lem. When revised plans were submitted, parking specification problems were discovered.
Acknowledging the city's deep opposition, Forest City ceased submitting revised plans in
October, 1971. In November, 1971, the low-income housing referendum ordinance was
passed, making the death of Parmatown Woods inevitable. Id. at 1078.
92 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5317.
95 494 F. Supp. at 1092. On Parma council member voted against submitting the CDBG
application at all, even with the low-income housing assistance goal set at zero, since he felt
that in submitting the application Parma would be "getting involved in an area where we
are seeking Federal subsidies in low-income housing." Id. at 1093.
Id. at 1094.
, Such agreements provide that the Metropolitan Housing Authority will make pay-
ments in lieu of taxes, and that in exchange the local government will extend all services
offered other residents to housing constructed under the auspices of the CMHA.
" Parma's mayor was quoted as saying: "We don't want anybody over which we have no
jurisdiction doing anything in our city." M. DANIELSON, supra note 6, at 95 (quoting Cleve-
land Plain Dealer, June 23, 1973).
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agreement with CMHA or develop its own city housing authority.97
While "[riacial motivations . . .are difficult to isolate from other fac-
tors which prompt exclusionary policies," ' it is clear that the effect of
even such indirect policies, as exemplified above, is to exclude minorities
by restricting their locational options. In summary, the zoning hegemony
of local communities, as granted by the states, works to enact parochial
interest through a wide variety of exclusionary land use controls, whose
effects combine to promote the racial segregation of American housing.
III. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT OF 1968
Suit against the city of Parma was commenced by the United States
Justice Department in 1973 pursuant to Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968, also known as the Fair Housing Act.9 ' The government alleged
that the city had engaged in a pattern or practice of housing discrimina-
tion through activities which made housing unavailable to homeseekers
because of their race, thus violating two sections of the Act.100
The Fair Housing Act is a potential tool in eliminating exclusionary
land-use controls legitimized by municipalities which result in the racial
segregation of housing. The Act declares a national policy of providing
fair housing throughout the nation;' °  makes unlawful discrimination in
the sale, rental and financing of housing; 2 bans discrimination in the
provision of brokerage services; 10 3 allows individual parties to file admin-
istrative complaints with the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment T1 and subsequently to act as "private attorney generals" in prose-
cuting civil damage suits,08 or to seek enforcement through civil actions
without pursuing administrative remedies;'"' empowers the Attorney
General to bring civil actions against people or groups reasonably be-
lieved to be engaged in a practice or pattern of discrimination, or when
any group of persons has been denied rights granted by the Act, where
this denial raises an issue of public importance;" 7 permits the Attorney
General to apply for preventive relief, including injunction, restraining
order, or other order as deemed necessary to secure the rights guaranteed
under Title VIII; 108 and invalidates any state or local law which permits
504 F. Supp. 913, 922 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (remedial order).
M. DANIELSON, supra note 6, at 89.
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1968).
100 See supra note 83 for the text of the sections of the Act allegedly violated.
42 U.S.C. § 3601.
I" ld. § 3604-05.
,13 Id. § 3606.
'o Id. § 3610 (a).
100 Id. § 3610 (c).
106 Id. § 3612.
07 Id. § 3613.
108 Id.
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discriminatory housing practices." 9
The provisions of the Fair Housing Act are to be given broad judicial
interpretation 110 in light of the expansive purpose of the legislation
which its sponsor in the Senate said is no less than to replace the ghettos
with "truly integrated and balanced living patterns."" This breadth of
interpretation is applied to a law which, by its own language, sweeps
broadly. Section 3604 (a)-(e) has the effect of reaching any discriminatory
act, including those relating to negotiations for sales and rentals, as well
as sales and rentals themselves;"' terms and conditions of sales or rent-
als, and provisions of services or facilities;"' advertisements for sale or
rent;" 4 representations of availability;" 6 and blockbusting conduct."' In
addition, section 3604 provides for any additional unspecified practice
which "otherwise makes unavailable or den [ies]" a dwelling to any person
because of race, color, religion, or national origin.' 1 The language in sec-
tion 3617, making it unlawful to "interfere with any person in the exercise
• . . of . . . any right""'  granted by the Act, is likewise inclusive in
nature.
The provisions relating to "pattern or practice" suits are characterized
by the same inclusiveness as the foregoing sections of the Act.' ' By its
terms, section 3613 is activated whenever the Attorney General has rea-
sonable cause to believe that rights granted by the Fair Housing Act are
Io d. § 3615.
"o United States v. City of Parma, 504 F. Supp. 913, 917 (1980) (remedial order) (gener-
ous construction concerning appropriate relief); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (generous construction of provisions endowing standing to
sue); Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 (1979) (generous construc-
tion of remedial provisions and of standing to sue).
M 114 CONG. REc. 3,422 (1968).
"12 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (a).
113 Id. § 3604 (b)
11 Id. § 3604 (c).
, Id. § 3604 (d).
Id. § 3604 (e).
Id. § 3604 (a).
I ld. § 3617.
" Section 3613 states:
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person
or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full
enjoyment of any of the rights granted by this subchapter, or that any group of
persons has been denied any of the rights granted by this subchapter and such
denial raises an issue of general public importance, he may bring a civil action in
any appropriate United States district court by filing with it a complaint setting
forth the facts and requesting such preventive relief, including an application for a
permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order against the
person or persons responsible for such pattern or practice or denial of rights, as he
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being trammeled. The basis of this reasonable belief is not subject to ju-
dicial inquiry or confirmation. 2 ' A suit may be launched when the Attor-
ney General reasonably believes that either of two situations exist: 1) that
a person or group 21 is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to
fair housing; or 2) that any group of persons has been denied their rights
under the Fair Housing Act, and this denial raises an issue of general
public importance. As with "reasonable belief," the Attorney General's
determination about the public importance of the defendant's conduct is
not judicially reviewable. 12'
What constitutes a practice or pattern of discrimination under the Fair
Housing Act has also been given a non-restrictive judicial interpreta-
tion. 23 The words "pattern or practice" have their generic meanings,
12 4
requiring only that the conduct of the defendant not be an isolated in-
stance of discrimination, 25 but rather recurrently unlawful. 2 The defen-
12 United States v. Hunter, 324 F. Supp. 529 (D. Md. 1971), aff'd, 459 F.2d 205 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
M A municipality is included in the term "person or group" as used in § 3613. United
States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 572 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 U.S. 1972
(1982); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1183-84 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975). See also Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n. v. City of Lack-
awanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
1.. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, 474 F.2d 115, 125 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 826 (1973).
123 Judicial interpretation of the key phrase "pattern or practice" has been necessary to
fill the partial gap left in the legislative history of the Act. The Fair Housing Act of 1968
had its genesis as S. 1358, an amendment to H.R. 2516, a House-passed bill providing statu-
tory protection to civil rights workers. Senators Walter Mondale and Edward Brooke co-
sponsored the amendment, introduced February 6, 1968. There seems to have been no spe-
cific Senate discussion concerning the practice-and-pattern provision of the bill, which had
to overcome conservative efforts to fillibuster against it. On March 1, the report of the Na-
tional Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, known as the Kerner Commission, was is-
sued, in the midst of attempts by Senate liberals to win a cloture vote on S. 1358. Against
the backdrop of the Commission's stark warnings regarding the likely results of a continua-
tion of national racial policies, cloture was invoked, and the bill passed the Senate on March
11. On its arrival at the House, the bill was bottled up in the Rules Committee, where it
might have remained. The very expeditious nature of the bill's passage in the House was a
direct result of the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., on April 4. The Fair Housing
Act was dislodged from the House Rules Committee the same day. On April 10, the House
debated the bill for a single hour, while National Guard Troops were called to quell racial
disturbances in the Capitol city. The Fair Housing Act passed the House by a vote of 250-
171, and was signed into law on April 11, 1968. For an exhaustive account of the legislative
battle for passage in the Senate, see Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a
Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969).
124 United States v. Mayton, 335 F.2d 153, 159 (5th Cir. 1964). Mayton, a voting rights
case, construed the term "pattern or practice" as used in the Civil Rights Act of 1960, 42
U.S.C. § 1971(e), relying on the legislative history of that Act. In the absence of guidance
from the drafters of the 1968 Act, courts have had recourse to construals of the term ap-
pearing in the earlier legislation.
"" Mayton, 335 F.2d at 159 (quoting the testimony of the Deputy Attorney General
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dant is charged with responsibility for all actions which are not acciden-
tal.2 7 The number of incidents necessary to establish a pattern depends
on the nature of the right protected as well as the nature of the viola-
tions.128 Blockbusting representations made by a real estate company to
three landowners has been held to constitute a pattern, 1 9 whereas one act
by a single person might not.130 However, the activities of several separate
defendants who happen to direct their sales operations at the same geo-
graphic area cannot be cumulated for the purpose of establishing a pat-
tern or practice of discrimination.2" While some showing of a coordinated
effort has been held necessary,' 32 it is not necessary for the Attorney Gen-
eral to prove that a conspiracy to violate the Fair Housing Act existed
among a group of defendants. In one formulation, the requirement when
the defendant is one entity is that the conduct be one which happens "in
the regular procedures followed by" that defendant. 3
It is clear that one of the primary features of a section 3613 Attorney
General's suit is the relatively large number of actions that fit under the
"pattern or practice" rubric as judicially interpreted. Particularly when
the defendant is a municipality, the pattern and practice suit seems an
appropriately flexible statutory tool able to reach a broad range of con-
duct by the city. Policies and practices not unlawful in themselves can
become evidence of a pattern of discrimination carried out in violation of
the Fair Housing Act. Thus under the deferential Euclid standard, exclu-
sionary zoning ordinances in Parma might be viewed as lawful exercises
of police power. The city's referendum requirements could pass muster
under the Supreme Court's Valtierra and Eastlake decisions. The munic-
ipal acts of defeating a fair housing ordinance and denying building per-
mits to developers of subsidized housing were exclusionary in effect, but
were not otherwise unlawful. However, when subjected to the dual analy-
sis of section 3604 (a) and section 3613, these acts were found to violate
the Fair Housing Act.1 34 The potential strength of the Act is its ability to
reach subtle forms of discrimination and to use exclusionary mechanisms
which restrict housing choice as evidence of racial discrimination.
Another advantage of the pattern and practice suit is its avoidance of
before the House Judiciary Committee concerning the meaning of "pattern or practice").
126 United States v. Ray Mitchell Realty Co., 327 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
127 United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1314 (D. Md. 1969).
,"8 United States v. Hunter, 324 F. Supp. 529, 525 (D. Md. 1971).
129 United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305. But see United States v. Bob Lawrence
Realty, 327 F. Supp. 487 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 414
U.S. 826 (1973), (three blockbusting representations made in one afternoon by two agents
employed by a single company, did not constitute a pattern or practice of discrimination).
,"' United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, 327 F. Supp. 487, 493 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
"I1 Id. at 491.
132 Id. at 493.
"s United States v. Hunter, 324 F. Supp. at 535.
' United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. at 1099.
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"one of the most muddled areas of our constitutional jurisprudence ''. 1 -
the question of whether the discriminatory actions of the municipality
offend the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In hous-
ing discrimination cases based on constitutional theories, municipal ac-
tions that have a disproportionate impact on a racial minority may not be
sufficient to impose liability on the defendant city. Plaintiffs may be re-
quired to prove purposeful design, as where city policies are intentionally
administered so as to discriminate impermissibly.3 6 In contrast, because
the statutory language of section 3604 (a) of the Fair Housing Act,
prohibiting housing discrimination on the basis of race, does not require
proof of intent, a pattern-and-practice attack on municipal exclusionary
land use practices may use a test based solely on the effect of the alleg-
edly discriminatory conduct - a test obviously easier for plaintiffs to em-
ploy with success. Thus, in United States v. City of Black Jack,1 3 7 Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit declared:
To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the plain-
tiff need prove no more than that the conduct of the defendant
actually or predictably results in racial discrimination; in other
words, that it has a discriminatory effect . . . The plaintiff need
make no showing whatsoever that the action resulting in racial
discrimination in housing was racially motivated . . . . Effect,
and not motivation, is the touchstone, in part because clever men
may easily conceal their motivation .... 138
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Arlington Heights (Arling-
ton Heights II),39 on remand for consideration of the plaintiff's cause of
35 McGee, supra note 23, at 970.
"' The leading case is Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The Supreme Court
reversed a court of appeals' invalidation of a qualifying test for Washington, D.C. police
officers. The lower court invalidated the test on equal protection grounds, deciding that the
test had the effect of excluding blacks on a basis unrelated to job performance. In reversing,
the Supreme Court held that proof of racially disproportionate impact alone was not suffi-
cient; purposeful design or administration of the test with intent to discriminate was also
necessary to the plaintiff's case. In the housing area, the Court held in Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), that "[piroof of racially discriminatory
intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause," id. at 265,
although it would be sufficient if race were but one of several motivating factors. The plain-
tiff in Arlington Heights, a non-profit development corporation attempting to build low-
and moderate-income housing, failed to carry this burden of proof. (The Court remanded
the case for consideration of the plaintiff's statutory claims under the Fair Housing Act,
which had not been considered by the Court of Appeals.) The difficulty for the plaintiff in
meeting the motive test and prevailing under an equal protection theory has led one com-
mentator to conclude that "the Constitution may not by itself prove to be a significant
instrument of metropolitan desegregation." McGee, supra note 23, at 995.
137 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
"s Id. at 1184-85 (footnotes omitted).
558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
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action under the Fair Housing Act, also held that a prima facie case
under the Act could be established on the basis of discriminatory effect
alone. The court bluntly stated that "[a] strict focus on intent permits
racial discrimination to go unpunished in the absence of evidence of overt
bigotry. . . . We cannot agree that Congress in enacting the Fair Housing
Act intended to permit municipalities to systematically deprive minorities
of housing opportunities simply because these municipalities act
discreetly. '"1 0
Some courts, however, have employed motivation tests, or at least such
language, in assessing pattern and practice suits brought under section
3613 of the Fair Housing Act. The effort to use a motivation test in con-
sidering liability under the Act has been accompanied by a Procrustean-
bed expansion of the judicial definition of "motive." In some cases, the
effort results in a circular argument that solely and effectively uses the
discriminatory effect of defendant's conduct to prove discriminatory mo-
tivation. In Kennedy Park Homes Association v. City of Lackawanna,'
the federal district court inferred a racially discriminatory motivation on
the part of the defendant city by examining the ultimately discriminatory
effect of Lackawanna's denial of building permits to a section 235 housing
development. 4" In a recent pattern and practice case, United States v.
City of Birmingham,"3 the government argued prior to trial that the sub-
urb's liability for violation of sections 3604 (a) and 3617 of the Fair Hous-
ing Act could be predicated solely on the effects of interference with a
non-profit group's attempt to construct subsidized housing in the "virtu-
ally all-white city." 4 However, at trial the government abandoned this
effort and instead sought to establish "that defendant actually intended
to discriminate on a proscribed basis." I" In stretching the concept of mo-
tive, the court found that the discriminatory intent did not have to be the
city's own. It was sufficient that the plaintiff prove that the city re-
sponded to the wishes of citizens opposed to the housing project, and that
the city knew that these opponents were at least partially motivated by
racial concerns."' Further, the city commission's desire to placate its con-
140 Id. at 1290.
"1 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), a/f'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 1010 (1971). The United States was granted plaintiff-intervenor status under § 3613 of
the Fair Housing Act.
142 In affirming, the court of appeals agreed with this finding of motivation, but hinted
that discriminatory effect would have been sufficient to impose liability on the city. 436
F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 1970).
143 538 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
" Id. at 827 n.9.
14 Id.
" Id. at 828. The citizen opposition to the subsidized housing project was fierce, with 75-
100 people commonly attending city Commission meetings to express their concern about
"those people" coming to Birmingham. The court found that the phrase "those people"
referred to blacks. Id. at 824.
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stituency did not need to be the sole motivating factor for its conduct.
The court held that "the discriminatory purpose need only be a motivat-
ing factor."' 4 7 In addition, the city's knowledge that some of its actions
regarding the subsidized housing project would have a foreseeably dis-
criminatory effect was held to constitute evidence of impermissible mo-
tive.1 '4 s Last, the court found that although there exists no constitutional
or statutory requirement for a municipality to provide housing for its low-
income citizens, the circumstances under which plans to construct such
housing are abandoned are relevant in the assessment of racially discrimi-
natory motivation. 4"
The Parma district court liability opinion clearly delineated the two
theories and stated that violations of the Fair Housing Act can be estab-
lished under either the motive or effect theory."50 However, in the same
manner as courts in Kennedy Park Homes and Birmingham have found
discriminatory motive based on discriminatory effect, Parma allows a
finding of discriminatory effect to rest, at least in part, on a foundation of
discriminatory motive. In discussing the proof required to establish a vio-
lation under the effects theory, the court cited four crucial factors: "1) the
strength of the showing of discriminatory effect; 2) evidence of discrimi-
natory intent; 3) the defendant's interest in taking the action complained
of; and 4) the nature of the remedy sought."' 5 1
In Parma the government asserted that under both the motive test and
the effects test the city had violated the Fair Housing Act. In affirming
the district court's finding of liability in part, the appeals court expressly
approved the lower court's assessments concerning the discriminatory in-
tent or effect of each instance of conduct alleged by the government to
have violated the Act.'15
Under the effect standard, once a prima facie showing of racially dis-
criminatory effect has been made, the burden shifts to the municipal de-
fendant, which must demonstrate that its conduct is justified by a com-
pelling government interest. 53 In some formulations, the defendant also
shoulders the burden of showing that no other conduct could serve the
desired interest with a less segregative impact."'
It appears then that broadness of purpose, language, and interpretation
can benefit plaintiffs attacking municipal patterns and practices of racial
discrimination under the Fair Housing Act. In addition, the ability to
"I Id. at 827.
148 id. at 828.
141 Id. at 829.
,.o 494 F. Supp. at 1053.
,' Id. at 1055 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
661 F.2d at 574-76.
,' United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1974).
494 F. Supp. at 1055 (citing Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978)).
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prevail under the effect or the motive theory distinguishes the pattern
and practice suit from constitutionally based claims for relief, which re-
quire the more difficult-to-prove element of intent to discriminate. How-
ever, the ultimate success of a pattern and practice suit is does not lie in
finding the defendant liabile, but rather in bringing about a change in
racially segregated housing patterns. It is the function of the judicial rem-
edy formed pursuant to a finding of municipal liability under the Act to
ensure that new housing opportunities actually become available to mi-
norities and are not instead simply talked about.
IV. THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN PATTERN AND PRACTICE SUITS
A. Remedial Reluctance
"Litigation is the most common recourse for those who are unable to
persuade suburban governments to change their land-use and housing
policies. ' 'l 66 The perception that courts are removed from the sphere of
narrow community values and have historically "advanced the interest
and rights of individuals and groups which lack political support, unpop-
ular causes, or challenge accepted practices," ' 6 makes them, in the eyes
of fair housing advocates, a natural locus of activity in seeking a remedy
for exclusionary municipal practices. ' However, the courts, including the
Supreme Court, have not embraced with enthusiasm the role desired for
them. They instead have been reluctant to deal with questions concerning
local land use. Judicial deference to local values has sometimes been ex-
pressed as the refusal of a court to sit as a super zoning board."' 8 In other
formulations, courts have voiced their reluctance to meddle in local mat-
ters which they viewed as legislative. '59 The Supreme Court has held that
where zoning policy is set by local procedures the lines drawn are pre-
sumptively valid and that "this exercise of discretion . . . is a legislative,
not a judicial function."' ' 0 However, there is a strong argument in favor
of the proposition that defeating exclusionary land-use practices is a
proper judicial function and that the question properly posed by the
courts is not "Should a remedy be fashioned?," but rather, "How should
,55 M. DANIELSON, supra note 6, at 159.
"6 Id. at 160.
"8 For a contrary argument that courts merely respond to the strongest interest group in
deciding land use cases, see R. LINOWES & D. ALLENSWORTH, THE POLITICS OF LAND-UsE
LAW ch. 2 (1976).
" Bow and Arrow Manor, Inc. v. Town of West Orange, 63 N.J. 335, 307 A.2d 563 (1973);
C.O.M.E. v. Chancy, 289 Ala. 555, 269 So.2d 88 (1972).
" "It is not our function to approve the ordinances before us, as to wisdom or desirabil-
ity. For alleged abuses involving such factors the remedy is the ballot box, not the courts."
Brae Burn, Inc., v. City of Bloomfield Hills, 350 Mich. 425, 431, 86 N.W.2d 166, 169 (1957).
110 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 23 (1974).
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this remedial process be carried out?" In addition, it seems that state and
local legislatures are "paralyzed" with respect to fair housing issues', 1 and
that, realistically, the courts are the only likely sources of remedy; thus,
the courts have a large share of the responsibility in carrying out the na-
tional policy of fair housing. This responsibility should not be shirked but
rather accepted, even at the expense of stretching the traditional remedy-
shaping powers of the courts.
Moreover, in the absence of legislative action, the alternative to com-
prehensive judicial intervention in exclusionary municipal conduct is an
unsatisfactory and piecemeal approach to the problem. The traditional
case-by-case approach of common law courts does not yield results in the
land-use control area. If "[elach variation on the exclusionary theme"162
is treated individually, a multiplicity of suits centering around the con-
duct of a single municipality could result, perhaps without ever disman-
tling of the exclusionary infra-structure. In Parma, for example, a judi-
cially-shaped remedy focused soley on the height restrictions and
parking-space specifications' would have yielded little in terms of pro-
gress toward racial integration in the suburb.1 4 Only a comprehensive ju-
dicially-shaped remedy can hold out that promise. 65
16, 3 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW: LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER, AMERICAN
LAND PLANNING LAW 111 (1975). This legislative paralysis, according to Williams, simply
stems from the domination of state legislatures by suburban representatives whose interests
are served by the current system of land-use controls. The local tax structure, which encour-
ages a community to seek "good ratables," functions to discourage subsidized housing. Id. at
112. A related reason that state legislatures have not taken the lead in promoting fair hous-
ing is that the legislative remedies seem radical, requiring as they would a renunciation of
local self-determination in favor of a regionalized assessment of moderate- and low-cost
housing needs. See Feiler, Metropolitanization and Land-Use Parochialism - Toward a
Judicial Attitude, 69 MICH. L. REV. 655 (1971). (For one example of a state-wide legislative
attack on exclusionary zoning, however, see 1980 CAL. STAT. 477, amending CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 65008) (local governments barred from using zoning or planning powers to discriminate
against developers of low-income housing). Further, even if some regionally-oriented fair
housing reform schemes are adopted, the attendant problems and "questions will simply be
presented to [courts] in another form." Feiler, supra at 662. For the contrary view that the
legislative forum is the only appropriate one for the solution of the fair housing problem, see
Note, The Inadequacy of Judicial Remedies in Cases of Exclusionary Zoning, 74 MICH. L.
REV. 760 (1976), and Notre, Toward Improved Housing Opportunities: A New Direction for
Zoning Law, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 330 (1972).
162 Mytelka & Mytelka, Exclusionary Zoning: A Consideration of Remedies, 7 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1, 19 (1975).
's' See supra text accompanying notes 50-59.
,o' Two additional arguments that support the necessity of a comprehensive judicial ap-
proach to exclusionary land controls are 1) that "the possibilities for delay are greater where
courts are content to gradually chip away at exclusionary policies, . ... until the developer
gives up and goes elsewhere." Mytelka & Mytelka, supra note 163, at 24; and 2)"the piece-
meal approach leaves room for substantial maneuvering. Imaginative draftsmen can usually
create fresh [exclusionary] devices, untrammeled by precedent." Id. at 19.
16' The promise of racial integration seems finally, at this writing, about to bear fruit in
Parma. The mechanics of the remedial order of the district court, as affirmed in part by the
1984-85]
27Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1984
136 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
B. The Basis for Judicial Remediation
There is ample precedent for increasing the scope of judicial remedy-
tailoring in fair housing litigation.
[Ilt is because legislators and administrators are properly con-
cerned with balancing numerous competing considerations that
courts are loathe to review the merits of their decisions, absent a
showing of arbitrariness or irrationality. But racial discrimination
is not just another competing onsideration. When there is proof
that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the
decision, this judicial deference is no longer justified.'8 6
Instead of adopting a deferential attitude, a court faced with a statutory
fair housing violation may, in Justice Cardozo's famous formulation, mold
"[tihe plastic remedies of the chancery . . . to the needs of justice."'6 7
Conversely, the court, whether confronting a defense based on separation
of powers18 or merely an intransigent local legislative body,' 9 has no
"equitable authority to exercise equitable powers so as to permit viola-
tions of statutes to continue." 7 ' Rather, courts have held, the proper ju-
dicial role is to evaluate which land uses are so vital to the public welfare
that their exclusion will be contrary to public policy and to shape reme-
dies that will eliminate improper exclusion. 17 ' Further, where the inter-
ests of many are involved, courts of equity might go farther in giving and
withholding relief than where only the private interests of a few are at
stake.
The fact that a suit is prosecuted under a statute has a dual effect on
the remedial powers of the court. Where statutes expressly change the
traditional equity practices, courts must accordingly adjust their reme-
dies. In addition, where statutes enunciate public policy clearly' they
Sixth Circuit, are in place. See Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 23, 1982 at 1A, col. 2; Id., Feb.
8, 1983, at 6A, col. 1; Feb. 23, at 1A, col. 5. In the final analysis, "housing for low- and
moderate-income families must be built, not just talked about." Mytelka & Mytelka, supra
note 163, at 18.
16 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66
(1977) (Arlington Hts. I).
667 Foreman v. Foreman, 251 N.Y. 237, 238, 167 N.E. 428, 429 (1929).
666 City of Richmond v. Randall, 215 Va. 506, 510, 211 S.E.2d 56, 61 (1975) (city's ability
to zone not protected by the separation of powers doctrine where it acted unreasonably).
169 Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 236 A.2d 395 (1970) (when court invalidated local ordi-
nance excluding apartment construction, city responded by rezoning quarry for apartment
use).
"I Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 524, 527
(1982) (emphasis added).
1'7 Roman Catholic Diocese v. Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, 47 N.J. 211, 223, 220 A.2d 97, 103
(1966) (Hall, J., concurring) (ordinance prohibiting schools in residential district).
1' For example, the invalidation of impermissibly exclusionary zoning ordinances as an
equitable remedy may be based on § 3615 of the Fair Housing Act, which specifies that
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comprise an addendum to the roster of equitable remedies, "leaving all
options open for the court's exercise of discretion."'' 7 3 In United States v.
West Peachtree 10th Corp.,74 the defendant argued that under section
3613 of the Fair Housing Act, the court's remedial options were limited to
issuing an injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found
this argument to be without merit, noting that past decisions construing
the identical phrase, "preventive relief including . . . a permanent or
temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order" as it occurred in
the Civil Rights Act of 1960,1 had held that the provision permitted the
grant of affirmative relief.
176
C. The "Pattern and Practice" Remedy
A pattern and practice suit brought against a city has as its aim the
dismantling of an entire municipal system of racially exclusionary prac-
tices and policies. Part of the system may consist, as it did in Parma, of
exclusionary zoning ordinances. But, as discussed above, the effectiveness
of the pattern and practice suit is in its ability to address exclusionary
controls which are not ordinance-based. The judicial remedy in pattern
and practice suits must affirmatively address these other aspects of mu-
nicipal behavior found violative of the Fair Housing Act. Thus, pattern
and practice suits and the remedies called for upon a finding of liability
can be distinguished from litigation which is addressed solely to exclu-
sionary ordinances. It is still instructive, however, to examine remedies
fashioned in the context of such litigation, since exclusionary ordinances
so commonly appear as components of pattern and practice suits under
the Fair Housing Act.
1. Ordinances: Declaration of Invalidity
Where a particular zoning ordinance has been found impermissibly ex-
clusionary, the "traditional equitable remedy is a declaration that the of-
fending ordinance is invalid and is usually coupled with an injunction
against its enforcement.' 1 77 For example, in Herzog v. City of Poca-
tello,178 the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's finding that
the city's refusal to grant plaintiff a variance was discriminatory, but re-
"any law of a State, a political subdivision, or other such jurisdiction that purports to re-
quire or permit any action that would be a discriminatory housing practice under this sub-
chapter . . . shall to that extent be invalid." 42 U.S.C. § 3615.
173 Mytelka & Mytelka, supra note 163, at 25.
174 437 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971).
17- 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c).
,' 437 F.2d at 228, (citing Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 371
U.S. 37 (1962).
177 Mytelka & Mytelka, supra note 163, at 25.
,"1 83 Idaho 365, 363 P.2d 188 (1961).
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versed the lower court's action in ordering the city to grant plaintiff the
variance sought. Instead, the appellate court limited its relief to invalida-
tion of the city's ordinance with respect to plaintiff's property. The court
stated that "[slince our system has not conferred upon the courts power
to exercise administrative functions in zoning matters, the court may not
order the enactment of zoning regulations such as is directed by the judg-
ment appealed from."' 79
A similarly simple declaration of invalidity can be directed against an
ordinance as it applied to an entire community,' or even an entire sec-
tion of a county,"8 ' rather than to a single tract. However, merely declar-
ing an ordinance invalid on an area-wide basis leaves a city "free to adopt
a scheme as unsatisfactory as that which was struck down."'8 2
2. Affirmative Relief Involving Ordinances
A more judicially activist approach is to afford the defendant affirma-
tive relief through rezoning the property in question, where a single plain-
tiff is seeking to construct subsidized housing. One commentator has
stated; "[o]bviously, if judicial review of local zoning actions is to result in
anything more than a farce, the courts must be prepared to go beyond
mere invalidation and grant definitive relief."'' 83
Even when deciding to grant some form of affirmative relief, courts
have preferred to allow local authorities some latitude in decision-making,
reasoning that even if mandated by the court, a solution emanating at
least partially from the community itself will more effectively remedy ex-
clusionary practices. 84 However, this judicial restraint may be rewarded
by municipal obstructionism of a type dubbed by one commentator "the
zoning amendment shuffle.' 8 5 By rezoning during the course of litigation,
municipal defendants can extend the suit through the need for reconsid-
eration. Other delay or obstructing tactics are also possible.
In Pascak Association v. Township of Washington,8 the plaintiffs pri-
marily sought relief from the suburb's refusal to grant a variance for the
"I Id. at 373-74, 363 P.2d at 193.
182 National Land & Investment Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504,
215 A.2d 597 (1965) (minimum acreage requirement invalid).
... Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 655, 107 S.E.2d 390, 391-92
(1959) (zoning code amendment which placed entire western two-thirds of the county under
large-lot limitation void).
"82 Note, The Inadequacy of Judicial Remedies in Cases of Exclusionary Zoning, 74
MicH. L. REV. 760, 767 (1976).
183 Kransnowiecki, Zoning Litigation and the New Pennsylvania Procedures, 120 U. PA.
L. REV. 1029, 1082 (1972).
18, See United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 578 (6th Cir. 1981) (imposition of
special master was error by district court because antithetical to philosophy of allowing local
jurisdiction to attempt to frame own solution).
182 Mytelka & Mytelka, supra note 163, at 29.
188 131 N.J. Super. 195, 329 A.2d 89 (1 Law Div. 1974).
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construction of a multi-family project; however, they also challenged the
township's entire zoning code as exclusionary. The initial action of the
appeals court was to sustain the challenge to the exclusionary ordinance,
but to give the township responsibility for rezoning. However, as a result
of this rezoning, the classification of the plaintiff developer's property did
not change. Accordingly, the court, probably suspecting bad faith on the
part of the township, called on experts who detailed the need for multi-
family housing in the area, and made specific recommendations which the
court adopted and imposed on the township, over its objections that the
courts lacked the power to rezone property.187 The court justified its in-
trusion on the theory that "the judiciary has historically and necessarily
exercised its power to compel coordinate branches of government to fulfill
their obligations as defined by the courts."'188 Pascak illustrates the initial
and traditional reluctance of courts to intervene in zoning issues and the
realization that effecting change may require them to do so.
3. United States v. City of Parma: The Ordinance Remedy
The government in Parma alleged that four of the city's land-use ordi-
nances violated the Fair Housing Act. First, a height-limitation ordi-
nance' 89 placed a ceiling of thirty-five feet on all future residential con-
struction. The district court noted that the height limitation made
construction of subsidized housing economically unfeasible 9 ' and that
since the passage of the ordinance no variances to construct taller build-
ings had been granted.19 ' The second ordinance subjected all subsidized
housing development in the city to voter approval by referendum.' 92 Call-
ing the language of the ordinance "all-inclusive,'' 93 the district court
noted that it even seemed to prevent private individuals from participat-
ing in any federal program that partially paid rents, and cited the ordi-
nance as an "unmistakable signal to developers of a climate of prejudice
against any government-subsidized housing."' 94 Both of the above ordi-
nances appeared on the ballot at the November, 1971 general election by
initiative petition. The election coincided with the public furor over the
proposed construction of Parmatown Woods, the federally subsidized sec-
tion 236 project.'95 With this background in mind, the district court
found that the adoption of both ordinances was racially motivated, and
187 131 N.J. Super. at 203, 329 A.2d at 94.
'S Id.
's' PARMA GENERAL BUILDING REGULATIONS § 1529.37.
United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1088 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (liability
opinion).
'' Id. at 1089.
192 PARMA BUILDING CODE § 1528.
293 494 F. Supp. at 1088.
"' Id. at 1089.
199 See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
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had an impermissibly discriminatory effect. However, reasoning that only
the subsidized housing referendum was solely aimed at low-income hous-
ing, the court totally invalidated only that ordinance.'9 6 Although the
height ordinance was equally impermissible under both the motivation
test and the effects test, the district court, under the flexible provisions of
section 3615 of the Fair Housing Act,19 7 invalidated the ordinance only as
it applied to future subsidized housing construction. 9 " The third ordi-
nance cited by the government in its complaint was one requiring two-
and-one-half parking spaces per dwelling unit for apartments.'99 The re-
quirement was shown in testimony to be sharply higher than prevailing
parking requirements for similar land usage in surrounding communi-
ties. 0 Under the same reasoning employed in its consideration of the
height limitation ordinance, the district court struck down the parking
requirement solely as it applied to construction of low- and moderate-
income housing,210 noting that there was no evidence of discriminatory
intent, but only of exclusionary effect. 2 The last ordinance assailed by
the government was enacted in 1974 and required voter approval of any
change in existing land uses or land-use ordinances.' 0 3 The court noted
that the zoning change ordinance had a chilling effect on applications for
all residential construction, and labelled as "Herculean" the task faced by
potential developers of subsidized housing in any attempt to build in
Parma.2 ° Because the zoning change ordinance, like the height limitation
and parking regulations, did not operate only against low- and moderate-
income housing, the district court rendered it invalid only as it applied to
such housing.206
With respect to Parma's exclusionary ordinances, the simple declara-
tion of invalidity was invoked against the ordinance most obviously ad-
dressed to subsidized housing. The remedial power of the court concern-
ing the other three ordinances, was guided by section 3615 of the Fair
Housing Act. Rather than acting as a blunt instrument, section 3615 gave
the district court the option of suspending the ordinances only to the ex-
tent that they would permit instances of discrimination as defined by the
Act. Section 3615 preserves the electorate's power to self-legislate, but
acts to ensure that legislation is in accordance with the law.'
"I' United States v. City of Parma, 504 F. Supp. 913, 920 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (remedial
order).
"D See supra note 173.
',' 504 F. Supp. at 920.
I" PARMA PLANNING AND ZONING CODE § 1197.03.
"' 494 F. Supp. at 1089.
504 F. Supp. at 920.
.2 494 F. Supp. at 1090.
"' PARMA BUILDING CODE § 1229.01.
" 494 F. Supp. at 1090.
200 504 F. Supp. at 920.
" "The sovereignty of the people is itself subject to those constitutional limitations
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4. Other Correctives To Municipal Conduct Found Discriminatory
In addition to partially or totally invalidating exclusionary ordinances,
courts may mandate a variety of other equitable remedies. At the district
court level in the Parma suit, the main elements of the remedial order
were: a) an injunction; b) an order mandating participation in housing
subsidy programs, with a numerical goal for new housing units fixed by
the court; and c) an order establishing a special master.
a) Injunction, once regarded as an extraordinary equitable measure, has
lost that character and become "a common, widely used judicial remedy
precisely because of its ability to fine tune the regulation of private con-
duct in a complex, modern society."20 7 In a pattern and practice suit, in-
junction may be used in a broad manner to halt any type of further dis-
criminatory action on the part of the defendant city, giving courts which
retain jurisdiction authority to intervene again should the defendant
backslide. The Parma remedial order, for example, enjoined the city from
"[tiaking any action which in any way" would further violate the Fair
Housing Act.210 Injunctions may also be focused on a specific municipal
action or ordinance.
2 09
b) Another equitable remedy available to the courts is that ordering the
city to develop or participate in programs resulting in the construction of
subsidized housing. The city of Parma was instructed by the district court
to sign a cooperation agreement with the regional public housing author-
ity or, alternatively, to establish its own housing authority in order to
implement the location of federal section 8 housing in the suburb.2 1 Fur-
ther, Parma was ordered to submit an acceptable CDBG application to
the Department of Housing and Urban Development, to correct its past
unwillingness to avail itself of federal funds for the construction of low-
and moderate-income housing.2 ' Where pattern and practice suits have
centered on municipal actions in preventing a particular developer from
constructing low-cost housing, the remedy has been expressed in terms
placing an affirmative duty on the city to take whatever steps are neces-
which have been duly adopted and remain unrepealed." Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385,
392 (1969).
2I Plater, supra note 171, at 545.
208 504 F. Supp. at 918. See also United States v. City of Birmingham, 538 F. Supp. 819
(E.D. Mich. 1982) (city enjoined from further interference with non-profit corporation's ef-
forts to construct subsidized housing).
... E.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (city enjoined from enforcing ordinance prohibiting multi-family con-
struction); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669
(W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971) (city en-
joined from condeming site targeted for subsidized housing or acquiring for use as park).
0 504 F. Supp. at 922.
Id. at 923. See supra text accompanying notes 93-5.
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sary to expedite the construction.2 12 The Eighth Circuit has held that
even where the original project which was the subject of fair housing liti-
gation had become unfeasible because of cost increases, the city was still
subject to a continuing duty to promote reasonably priced integrated
housing equivalent to the project which would have been constructed had
the alleged racially discriminatory zoning not been enacted.212 However,
in Parma, the Sixth Circuit was not prepared to go so far. The district
court's attempt to establish an annual numerical goal for new low-income
units was reversed by the appellate court. 4 Calling the requirement that
133 low- and moderate-income units be provided per year "premature," '21,
the court of appeals noted that the actual mechanics of construction were
dependent on the "housing development community"' rather than on
the city itself. Hence, in this attempt by a district court to quantify a
municipal defendant's fair housing obligation, the appellate court ex-
pressed its unwillingness to radically extend the reach of equity. The phi-
losophy underlying this reluctance is substantially the same as that which
the court of appeals applied to the problem of appointing a special
master, discussed below.
c) Although the appointment of a special master to oversee court-or-
dered remedies is not unknown in school desegregation,21 7 voting rights,"
and prisoners' rights2 9 cases, the imposition of such an overseer is un-
precedented in litigation under the Fair Housing Act of 1968.220 The
Parma district court ordered the appointment of a special master to su-
pervise the implementation of its remedial order. The role of the master
as proposed by the district court was to prepare recommendations for the
court, conduct hearings and investigations and evaluate the performance
of the city under the remedial order. The master was to have unrestricted
access to city records and city staff, as well as all public or private city
meetings. The master was to be compensated by the city of Parma at a
rate set by the district court. 2 The district court acknowledged the un-
precedented nature of the appointment of a special master in a fair hous-
ing case, but justified the remedy under the court's broad equity powers.
212 E.g., United States v. City of Birmingham, 538 F. Supp. 819, (E.D. Mich. 1982); Ken-
nedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y. 1970).
Parkview Hts. Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 605 F. 2d 1033, 1038-40.
" United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 577-78 (6th Cir. 1981).
215 Id.
116 Id. at 578.
" Brown v. Board of Educ. II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
"' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Pugh v. Locke 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
"0 For a discussion of the use of special masters, see Comment, Equitable Remedies: An
Analysis of Judicial Utilization of Neo-Receiuerships to Implement Large-Scale Institu-
tional Change, 1976 Wisc. L. Rv. 1161.
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It further cited the extensive scope of the suburb's unlawful conduct and
the complex nature of the remedy, declaring that "[t]he magnitude of the
wrong has dictated the magnitude of the remedy.... 2 On appeal, the
Sixth Circuit struck the special master provision. Several factors figured
in the reversal of this portion of the district court's remedy. First, the
appeals court found appointment of a special master to be "an extra-ordi-
nary remedy,"" 3 and could not resolve its doubts concerning the lack of
precedent for such a move. Second, the district court had acted on its
own motion; no witness for the government had suggested a need for an
overseer. In its lengthy liability and remedial opinions, the district court
had strongly supported its findings with testimony from the trial. A con-
trasting lack of external support for the appointment of a master was
noteworthy to the court of appeals.2 4 Most important, the appeals court
cited the special master provisions as a departure from the principle that
judicial intervention in municipal affairs should be as unintrusive as pos-
sible, even where the court was mandating the performance of extensive
remedial actions by the suburb. The court expressed its approval of a
policy of precisely circumscribed remedial measures: "[C]ourts must care-
fully tailor the remedy in cases of statutory violations, limiting it to relief
necessary to correct the violations. ' ' 2 05 Primary value was placed by the
court of appeals on drawing the Parma community into plans determina-
tive of its future. Steps toward this end had been taken by the district
court in ordering that a fair housing committee comprised of Parma resi-
dents be appointed to aid in implementing housing integration.2  The
court of appeals found that the appointment of a special master would be
antithetical to this spirit, and to the principle of "giving maximum free-
dom to the local jurisdiction to develop its own solution. 22 7 This same
policy was the foundation for the rejection of the district court's require-
ment for 133 units of low-income housing per year. The quantification of
Parma's fair housing duty would have been much more intrusive than the
form in which the remedy was framed by the court of appeals.
These aspects of the Sixth Circuit's decision indicate that courts are
not generally prepared to impose the most intrusive forms of remedy on
municipalities which have violated the Fair Housing Act, although the
judiciary will insist on statutory compliance, and to that extent abandon
its historic deference towards local jurisdictions in the area of land use
control.
222 504 F. Supp. at 924.
223 661 F.2d at 579.
224 Id.
222 Id. at 576.
226 504 F. Supp. at 921.
227 661 F.2d at 578.
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V. CONCLUSION
The constitutional grant of police power gives municipalities the ability
to exclude unwanted groups from residence by employing exclusionary
land use controls. The Fair Housing Act of 1968, however, not only enun-
ciates a national policy in conflict with the land-use hegemony of subur-
ban communities, but also is a tool for reaching subtle forms of racial
housing discrimination which are not based on land-use controls. The
Parma appellate court decision indicates that even though courts are pre-
pared to demand compliance with the letter of the Fair Housing Act, they
are not ready to enforce its spirit to the point of installing court-ap-
pointed overseers or mandating other intrusive measures. There is justifi-
able concern that for courts to encroach too far on a community's legisla-
tive perogatives is equivalent to destroying self-government and replacing
it by judicial fiat. However, to the extent that a community employs the
power to control land use to ends not in accordance with the national
policy of ending segregated housing, it acts illegitimately. The police
power is granted to cities. When a court finds that this power has been
abused, "the court has not merely the power but the duty to render a
decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of
the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future.112 8 In this re-
spect, it is arguable that the Parma appeals court was not bold enough. It
is possible that the court's strategy was to preserve as much of Parma's
municipal autonomy as possible in the hopes that this "carrot" would en-
sure that the suburb would reform its discriminatory practices. However,
it is doubtful whether a city with such a deeply entrenched system of
exclusion as Parma is sufficiently motivated by the "carrot" approach.
The "stick" - continuing the jurisdiction of the district court over the
city's future efforts to comply with the remedial order - would seem to
be the factor most responsible for any future subsidized housing which
comes to Parma.
The courts will probably continue to avoid the potential confrontation
between their duty to enforce the Fair Housing Act and the separation of
powers doctrine by refusing to impose extremely intrusive remedies on
cities found violating the Act. However, when Congress refrained from
limiting the judicial remedies available under the Act, it implicitly au-
thorized even the most stern measures in furtherance of the national goal
of ending housing discrimination. This goal must be met. The cost of im-
posing explicit judicial guidance on a community whose exclusionary land
use controls function to strictly segregate its housing is not too great to
pay.
KAREN E. RUBIN
228 Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
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